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HLD-140 (April 2011)      NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1683 
 ___________ 
 
 WILFREDO FLOREZ-MONTANO, 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
 WILLIAM A. SCISM, WARDEN;  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-02404) 
 District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 29, 2011 
 Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, ALDISERT and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
  
(Opinion filed: June 2, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
  Wilfredo Florez-Montano, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Federal 
Correctional Institution Allenwood in White Deer, Pennsylvania, appeals from an order 
of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his 
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petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm. 
I. 
  On October 1, 2002, Florez-Montano was convicted by a jury in the Middle 
District of Florida of both possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess 
with the intent to distribute a controlled substance while aboard a vessel subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement 
Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1903(a), (g) & (j) (2002).  He was thereafter sentenced on 
February 14, 2003, to 292 months of imprisonment and 60 months of supervised release.  
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Florez-Montano‟s convictions 
and sentence on appeal.  About five-and-a-half years later, Florez-Montano filed a motion 
to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the sentencing court denied as 
time-barred. 
  Florez-Montano subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  He alleged that his 
convictions and sentence were unconstitutional because the sentencing court determined 
the identity of the controlled substance underlying his convictions by a preponderance of 
the evidence and used that determination to enhance his sentence, instead of submitting 
the issue to the jury and requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  The case was 
referred to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended dismissing the petition on the basis 
that relief under § 2241 was not available to Florez-Montano.  The District Court adopted 
the Magistrate Judge‟s recommendation and dismissed the petition.  Florez-Montano 
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timely appealed. 
II. 
  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 
2253(a).  “We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s legal conclusions and 
apply a clearly erroneous standard to its factual findings.”  Manna v. Schultz, 591 F.3d 
664, 665 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). We may summarily affirm if no substantial 
question is presented by the appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.    
  “Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are the presumptive means by 
which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or sentences that are allegedly in 
violation of the Constitution.”  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 
2002).   Accordingly, “unless a § 2255 motion would be „inadequate or ineffective,‟ a 
habeas corpus petition under § 2241 [attacking a prisoner‟s conviction or sentence] 
cannot be entertained by the court.”  Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 
538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).  That standard is met “only 
where the petitioner demonstrates that some limitation of scope or procedure would 
prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording him a full hearing and adjudication of his 
wrongful detention claim,” and is not met simply because a § 2255 motion has been or 
would be unsuccessful.   Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538-39. 
  Florez-Montano contends that § 2255 is an inadequate vehicle for his 
current constitutional challenge because he is relying on a change in the law that was 
triggered by the Supreme Court‟s opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, which held that any 
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fact that enhances a defendant‟s sentence other than a prior conviction must be submitted 
to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  Federal 
courts, including ours, that had previously permitted the identity of a controlled substance 
to be determined by the sentencing court have held, in the wake of Apprendi, that a jury 
must make that determination when identity of the controlled substance is used to 
increase the maximum sentence imposed on the defendant.   See, e.g., United States v. 
Henry, 282 F.3d 242, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2002) (vacating sentence that exceeded lowest 
statutory maximum because sentencing court‟s determination of drug identity by a 
preponderance of the evidence violated Apprendi); United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 
1088, 1100 (11th Cir. 2002) (“There is constitutional error under Apprendi . . . only if the 
sentencing judge‟s factual finding actually increased the defendant‟s sentence above the 
statutory maximum . . . , and only if the fact that led to the enhanced sentence was not 
charged in the federal indictment or submitted to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”).  Based on that change in the law, Florez-Montano contends that he is actually 
innocent, because no jury ever determined the identity of the substance he was convicted 
of possessing, and that he should be entitled to pursue his claim under § 2241.
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  Contrary to Florez-Montano‟s assertion that his constitutional argument 
was not previously available, the change in law upon which he relies occurred before he 
was convicted and sentenced.  Thus, he clearly could have raised his constitutional claim 
                                                 
1
  Violations of the Maritime Law Drug Enforcement Act are punishable pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. § 960, see 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 1903(g) (2002), which provides penalties of varying 
degrees depending on the nature and quantity of the substance involved in the conviction. 
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before the sentencing court and on direct appeal, or via a § 2255 motion on the basis that 
counsel was ineffective for having failed to invoke Apprendi, assuming that counsel 
indeed failed to do so.  Furthermore, since Apprendi does not decriminalize the conduct 
for which Florez-Montano was convicted, his case is distinguishable from In re 
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 248 & 251-52 (3d Cir. 1997), in which we permitted the 
petitioner to invoke § 2241 because he alleged that had been convicted for conduct 
subsequently deemed by the Supreme Court not to be criminal, but could not pursue his 
constitutional claim via § 2255 due to AEDPA‟s restrictions on successive § 2255 
motions.
2
  See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120-21 (“Unlike the intervening change in law in In 
re Dorsainvil that potentially made the crime for which that petitioner was convicted 
non-criminal, Apprendi dealt with sentencing and did not render conspiracy to import 
heroin, the crime for which [petitioner] was convicted, not criminal.”).  Thus, Florez-
Montano cannot establish that § 2255 provides an inadequate and ineffective remedy 
such that he is entitled to pursue his claim through § 2241.   
  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court 
because Florez-Montano‟s appeal does not present a substantial question.     
 
  
                                                 
2
   The provisions pursuant to which Florez-Montano was convicted have been revised 
and recodified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503 & 70506, but the law still criminalizes his conduct. 
